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Abstract

In the decades following World War II, the Louisiana National Guard evolved due to
world, national, and local events. In response to the United States’ Cold War policies to contain
Communism, the Guard expanded, professionalized, and was occasionally called to federal
service. In conjunction with Cold War fears of external attack and internal subversion, a civil
defense mission brought coordination between federal, state and local response agencies. Despite
the lack of large scale war service or an attack on the U.S. homeland , the skills and
responsibilities acquired by the Louisiana Guard during this time period resulted in an enhanced
ability to respond to Louisiana’s biggest practical threat, i.e. natural disasters.

Keywords: National Guard, Louisiana, Military, Cold War, Civil Defense, Emergency Response
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Introduction

On November 11, 1946, in a publicized Armistice Day ceremony at the Municipal
Auditorium in New Orleans, Major General Raymond H. Fleming accepted the return of the
regimental colors of the Louisiana National Guard from the U.S. Army1. Most of the state’s
units, federalized in 1940, had been in training or fighting overseas since 1941. A return to state
duty, however, did not mean a return to the pre-war status quo. The end of World War II
eventually signaled a dramatic expansion of the peacetime U.S. armed forces, including the
National Guard. Unlike the aftermath of the First World War, U.S. foreign policy did not return
to non-intervention in European affairs. Although the United States had some involvement in the
Western Hemisphere and parts of Asia since the late nineteenth century, the level of intervention
increased as the bi-polar geopolitical nature of the Cold War developed. Immediately after
victory, it seemed as though a retreat from foreign affairs might again occur as the military
actually saw a massive demobilization through 1946. The passage of the National Security Act
in 1947, combined with reaction to the new Soviet nuclear capability and the rise of Communist
China in 1949, began a buildup of military resources and direct engagement with the outside
world.2 While the threat of mutually assured nuclear destruction kept a direct conflict with the
Soviet Union at bay, ideological and economic competition over the decolonizing Third World
created occasional regional wars. Domestic civil defense, however, remained a high concern in
the U.S. as fears of communist expansion and a potential nuclear attack influenced political
dialogues and citizens’ imaginations. Despite their combat record from both World Wars, Army

1

Evans J. Casso, Louisiana Legacy: A History of the State National Guard (Gretna: Pelican Publishing Company,
1976), 183.
2
Abbott A. Brayton, “American Reserve Policies Since World War II,” Military Affairs Vol. 36, No. 4 (Dec. 1972):
140.
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National Guard units were generally placed in a strategic reserve status for most of the Cold
War. Even so, the Guard’s federal and state roles expanded during the early days of this period.
The enhanced training, increased funds, and expanded mission of the Louisiana National Guard
(LANG) during the Cold War were expressed in several ways. While adapting it to national
needs and mandates, the Louisiana Guard commanders of the early Cold War period, Raymond
Fleming and Raymond Hufft, shaped the organization for the decades ahead. These two adjutant
generals alternated tenures four times between 1948 and 1964, coincident with gubernatorial
elections and the rotation of rival factions in state government. During a period of thirty six
years, Fleming and Hufft were the only two commanders of the Louisiana National Guard.
While this thesis primarily focuses on the story of the organization itself, it is important to
understand these leaders’ personalities and backgrounds as well as the unique succession of
command that occurred since their impact on the state’s National Guard was so great.
Ray Fleming commanded a battery of New Orleans’ 141st Field Artillery during World
War I and was named adjutant general of Louisiana by Governor Huey Long in 1928. 3 He
commanded the Louisiana National Guard through the Great Depression and World War II,
forging relationships with other states as well as the U.S. Army.4 Fleming emphasized the need
for manpower procurement policies in the case of national emergency in the late 1930s. His
efforts influenced selective service reform just prior to the U.S. entry into World War II.5 His
influence was also a factor in securing central Louisiana as a site for one of the largest training

3

The 141st Field Artillery is commonly known by its more traditional name, the Washington Artillery. With official
lineage going back to 1838, it is Louisiana’s oldest National Guard unit.
4
Casso, Legacy, 234.
5
General Malin Craig letters to Brigadier General Raymond Fleming, 7 March 1938, 9 March 1938, and 6 March
1939. Folder 20, Box 2, Raymond H. Fleming Collection, Louisiana National Guard (LANG) Archives, New
Orleans, Louisiana. Craig was U.S. Army Chief of Staff from 1935 to 1939. Also see Fleming speech transcripts
relating to emergency manpower procurement in the same folder.
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maneuvers in United States history.6 Fleming’s “resignation” in 1948 was the result of a
political imbroglio in which he offended Leander Perez, the political boss of Plaquemines Parish
and power broker within the Louisiana Democratic Party.7 The favored 1948 gubernatorial
candidate, Earl Long, needed Perez’ support and promised to name someone else Adjutant
General. Despite resigning as Adjutant General, Fleming retained command of the 39th Infantry
Division, which LANG reported to at the time.8 In 1950, he was named Chief of the National
Guard Bureau in Washington, D.C.9
Upon his inauguration, Governor Earl Long named thirty-three year-old Raymond Hufft
as adjutant general of Louisiana. Not only was Hufft the most decorated World War II veteran
from the state, he was politically connected to Leander Perez, Congressman F. Edward Hebert,
and former Governor Jimmy Noe.10 To date, General Hufft is the youngest officer appointed
adjutant general in Louisiana. His military career started in 1934 as a private in the Louisiana
National Guard with the 108th Cavalry Regiment, which was reorganized into the 105th Coastal
Artillery Battalion in 1940. He commanded a battery of the 105th in the Pacific theater of the war
before volunteering for the First Special Service Force, a predecessor to today’s Special Forces.
11

Hufft’s service with the Force essentially launched his career. The unit, which was later known

6

Casso, Legacy, 23.
F. Edward Hebert and John McMillan, “Last of the Titans”: The Life and Times of Congressman F. Edward
Hebert of Louisiana (Lafayette: University of Southwestern Louisiana, 1976), 265. In 1943, Louisiana Governor
Sam Jones and Leander Perez faced off in a notorious political fight over the appointment of a Plaquemines Parish
sheriff. Jones ordered General Fleming to send State Guard troops to enforce his appointment. Fleming complied
with his boss’ order, gaining the eternal enmity of Perez, who made sure he would not be re-appointed in 1948.
8
Raymond H. Fleming 201 File, Folder 3, Box 1, Raymond H. Fleming Collection, Louisiana National Guard
Archives, New Orleans, Louisiana.
9
Michael D. Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War: The Army National Guard, 1636-2000 (Lawrence: Kansas
University Press, 2003), 403.
7
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Hebert, Last of the Titans, 122-123.
Robert H. Adleman and George Walton, The Devil’s Brigade (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1966), 246. The
lineage from the First Special Service Force to modern Army Special Forces units is not a direct one because the
FSSF ceased to exist in1945. In 1960, during a special ceremony at Fort Bragg, the former commander of the First
11

3

as “The Devil’s Brigade,” specialized in dangerous missions behind enemy lines. Using his
irregular training, Hufft led a reconnaissance mission over the Rhine the night before the Allied
armies crossed into Germany. He was seriously wounded in the ensuing battle and finished his
war service in a military hospital.12 When Hufft’s Guard unit was federalized in 1940, he was a
first lieutenant. He returned to Louisiana a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army in 1945. His
awards included the Distinguished Service Cross, the Silver Star, the Bronze Star, and the Purple
Heart, among many others.13 While Hufft’s relation to influential politicians likely helped his
appointment from Long, the officer clearly had combat credentials and command experience. He
served as the adjutant general for Earl Long from 1948 to 1952 and then again from 1956 to
1960. In the years 1952 to 1956, anti-Long reformer Robert Kennon served as governor and
brought back Fleming, who had retired from his federal position in D.C. Kennon served as an
officer under Fleming prior to World War II.14 In 1960, Fleming was again appointed by
Governor Jimmie Davis.15
Fleming was an able administrator who had considerable experience and national
influence. He had strong ties to the National Guard Bureau in Washington D.C. and was
preferred by many of the older officers in the Louisiana National Guard. Meanwhile, Ray Hufft
was a “maverick”, a strong personality who commanded with a wink and a smile, effective and

Special Service Force, Major General (Retired) Robert Frederick, presented the colors of the unit to Colonel
Edwards, commanding officer of the 7th Special Forces Group.
12
George A. Fisher, The Story of the 180th Infantry Regiment (Oklahoma City: George A. Fisher, 1947). A selfpublished memoir with no page numbers, this was written by a soldier of the 180 th Infantry. Raymond Hufft was
commanding a battalion of the 180th when he was wounded after crossing the Rhine. Fisher offers a first-hand
account toward the end of the work.
13
Casso, Legacy, 236-240.
14
Francis C. Grevemberg, My Wars: Nazis, Mobsters, Gambling, and Corruption (Lafayette: Beau
Bayou Publishing Company, 2004), 63-66.
15
Casso, Legacy, 235
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inspiring to younger soldiers. The combination of Fleming’s administrative acumen and Hufft’s
charisma ultimately proved effective for the organization during the period discussed.16

Major General Ray Fleming 1950, left. Major General Ray Hufft 1959, right. Photos
courtesy Louisiana National Guard (LANG) Archives.

It was a transitional period for the Louisiana Army Guard. Its traditional roles connected
to the US military and the state were redefined and, in some cases, evolved during the time
period discussed. This is reflected in the areas of federal military involvement, domestic civil
defense, and emergency response. The federal government occasionally called up Guard units to
federal duty, but overseas activity was not common. The adjutant generals were also made
directors of Louisiana’s Selective Service system, which affected the relationship between the

16

Ibid, 233-240

5

Guard and the regular Army in terms of manpower management.17 The Louisiana Army National
Guard’s further involvement in federal Cold War issues included the organization of specialized
warfare units and international refugee aid. Civil defense support was an almost entirely new role
for the organization. This mission resided in an ill-defined area between federal and state duty. It
involved training for the possibility of a conventional or nuclear attack on the homeland and
working with civilian agencies and organizations in this regard. Emergency response was
another traditional role that evolved between 1946 and 1965. A series of hurricanes, floods, and
industrial accidents created a higher need for response capability. Expanded funding, more
advanced equipment, and the training provided for war and civil defense resulted in a larger
emergency related role that culminated with the Hurricane Betsy response in 1965. Ultimately,
Major Generals Fleming and Hufft used national Cold War defense policy, the increased funding
it brought, and civil defense resources to shape the Louisiana National Guard into an
organization that could respond much more effectively to the frequent natural and man-made
disasters that Louisiana would face.
The historiography of this period in Louisiana Army National Guard history is limited.
Earlier treatments of Cold War developments were written for the National Guard as a whole,
such as The Minute Man in Peace and War by Jim Dan Hill and John K. Mahon’s History of the
Militia and National Guard.18 Hill wrote as a former Guardsmen and showed clear bias toward
the National Guard system, often in almost emotional terms. Mahon’s book is much more
objective and quite useful as a general National Guard history. More recently, multiple works by

17

Casso, Legacy, 233-234
Jim Dan Hill, The Minute Man in Peace and War: A History of the National Guard (Harrisburg, PA: The
Stackpole Company, 1964). John K Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard (New York: Macmillan
Publishing, 1983).
18
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Michael D. Doubler offer an extensive survey of state militia and National Guard History. His
writing, such as Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, also cover the Guard as a whole in a scholarly
way.19 While Mahon and Doubler provide a substantive overview, they are general treatments,
using occasional examples from specific state National Guard units but never providing a full
case study or spending much time on any one state or on one era.
In the 1970s, Evans J. Casso wrote Louisiana Legacy: A History of the State National
Guard, which relates Louisiana’s militia and Guard history up through World War II.20 Two
chapters go beyond that, but they mostly consist of opinion and speculation on the future. Casso
had access to the Louisiana National Guard archives, then referred to as the Adjutant General’s
Office library. The book is a good survey of Louisiana military history from the standpoint of the
militia and National Guard, but was written for a popular audience and was apparently at one
time used by some of the state’s high schools in their civics curriculum.21 As with other sources
noted, Casso focuses almost entirely on the federal military role of the Guard. None of the aforementioned books cover much ground in relation to the National Guard’s role in civil defense or
disaster response. There are some contemporaneous journal articles about civil defense, but they
tend to focus on political theory rather than the activities and preparations of the military and
government agencies. While at least one journal article recognizes the changing role of the
Guard regarding disaster response, most articles and books concerning natural disasters in the
1940s-1960s view them through a social, cultural, and/or political lens, but not many focus on
the first responders themselves.22 An understanding of the development of the Louisiana

19

Doubler, Civilian in Peace.
Casso, Legacy.
21
Multiple officers in the Louisiana National Guard, as of this writing, have mentioned this to the author.
22
Philip H. Burch, Jr. and Bennett M. Rich, “The Changing Role of the National Guard,” The American Political
Science Review Vol. 50, No. 3 (September 1956): 702-706. This article directly, but briefly, talks about the Guard’s
growing disaster response responsibilities. For a good example of a social/political article examining disasters in the
20

7

National Guard in the second half of the twentieth century would not be complete without
including the evolution of domestic capabilities, responsibilities, and missions. Flood and
hurricane duty preceded World War II, but disaster relief responsibilities of the Louisiana Guard
expanded during the Cold War period, typically in conjunction with the civil defense role.
Hurricanes Flossie, Audrey, Hilda, and Betsy occurred in this era, as did a major levee break at
Port Allen, Louisiana and several industrial disasters. This paper will use a combination of some
of the above sources, other secondary sources, contemporaneous newspaper articles, primary
source documents from the Louisiana National Guard Archives, and archival papers that
prominent Louisiana Guardsmen have left with area university collections.

period, see Andy Horowitz, “Hurricane Betsy and the Politics of Disaster in New Orleans’ Lower Ninth Ward,
1965-1967,” The Journal of Southern History Vol. 80, No. 4 (November 2014): 893-934.
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Chapter 1: Federal Mobilization and Training
The Louisiana Army National Guard’s role within the U.S. Army shifted after World
War II. There was significant debate inside the military over the organization and use of the
National Guard. The Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy administrations all viewed the National
Guard as an important component, but there was some debate within the military about
abandoning the state based system in favor of a singular federal militia. There were also calls for
universal military training for males. Ultimately, key military leaders favored the American
tradition of the volunteer “citizen soldier” while state politicians and members of Congress did
not want to lose favor with constituents back home.23 Louisiana retained its state military
apparatus, but exactly how the dual federal/state role would play out as part of a superpower’s
military was still unclear.
The most direct contribution of the Louisiana Army National Guard to the Cold War was
through limited federal mobilizations. In both World Wars, the Guard was fully mobilized until
the conflict was over and won. In the new global paradigm, “hot” conflicts would be limited,
both in scope and expected outcomes. The first federal mobilization came with the Korean War.
In September of 1950, Louisiana’s 773rd Tank Battalion was called up to replenish the regular
Army’s strategic reserve in the continental United States at Fort Polk and, later, Fort Benning.
The unit remained activated until November of 1954.24 The military initiated an individual
rotation policy geared toward a reliance on draftees, sending soldiers into one year commitments
in Korea with no regard for continuity in Guard unit personnel. Despite the 773rd’s support

23

Doubler, Civilian in Peace, 219-225.
773rd Tank Battalion 1946-196 folders, Vertical File, LANG Archives. The unit remained active for that whole
period, but the individual men who were initially mobilized with the unit were not. Typical service for an individual
soldier was for a year.
24
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mission within the continental United States, most individuals from the tank unit departed for
overseas service in Korea.25 As Chief of the National Guard Bureau in Washington, Fleming had
to calm down fears of Guardsmen being unready for combat. He assured that they would receive
proper training prior to deployment. This was indeed the case, as Guardsmen did require a period
of combat training before departing for Korea.26
Issues arose surrounding personnel continuity within the activated National Guard units.
As Louisiana personnel were levied to regular units in Europe or Korea, U.S. Army replacements
filled the 773rd. By the third year of federal service, the unit no longer retained any of its original
Louisiana members. Guardsmen returning home after a tour of duty had no home unit to return
to because theirs was still active in federal service. This issue showed the lack of coordination
and communication between “Big Army” and the National Guard. In an attempt to help maintain
unit lineage so prized by state militias, the National Guard Bureau created a “mirror unit” with a
smaller authorized personnel strength back in Louisiana, called the 773rd Tank Battalion
(NGUS).27 Units of the NGUS (National Guard-United States) were created as an ad hoc
solution to the problem. After the unit on federal mobilization was redeployed to its state and
returned to the command of the governor, it was officially merged with the NGUS “mirror unit.”
The Truman Administration’s rotation policy and creation of temporary NGUS units was very
unpopular with National Guard leadership and supporters because they believed it threatened the
unit integrity inherent in the Guard.28 Guard supporters felt it slighted the nation’s oldest

“773rd Tank Battalion,” Louisiana National Guard pamphlet, 1955, LANG Archives, New Orleans. Also see
Curney J. Dronet, A Perspective View – The Louisiana Brigade: The Evolvement of the 256 thMechanized Infantry
Brigade (Separate), 1770-2004 (Sulphur, LA: Wise Printing, 2005), 39-40.
26
Times Picayune clipping, 1950, Specific date clipped out, National Guard Publicity scrapbook 1950, 170, LANG
Archives.
27
“773rd Tank Battalion” pamphlet
28
Doubler, Civilian in Peace, 231-235, also see Mahon, History of Militia, 208-212.
25
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military traditions while Guard detractors felt it illustrated the antiquated notions of a state
militia. 29 General Hufft was firmly in the camp of the former. He was not afraid to publicly
criticize President Truman’s policies on this, or any number of issues. By the time Fleming
returned to the Louisiana adjutant general position in 1953, the Korean War was winding down
and the Army was no longer calling up guardsmen. He was, however, the Chief of the National
Guard Bureau from 1950-1953, a position which gave him some influence within the U.S.
military. He was also powerful within the National Guard Association of the United States
(NGAUS), called by some the “Guard lobby,” as a former president of the organization.30 Both
critics and supporters of the National Guard admit that the NGAUS was typically successful in
currying favor with the U.S. Congress.31

29

Doubler, Civilian in Peace, 231-235.
The National Guardsman, Feb. 1948, 12.
31
Martha Derthick, The National Guard in Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), 119-122.
30
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773rd Tank Battalion, circa 1950s. Courtesy Louisiana National Guard Archives

In 1952 and 1955, Congress passed two Armed Forces Reserve Acts that laid out more
clearly the responsibilities, regulation, and composition of military reserve forces. The National
Guard was generally placed in a higher position than the U.S. Army Reserve, although the
Reserves made gains as well. Eisenhower’s “New Look” emphasized the possibility of nuclear
warfare, which put the reserve components into a more prominent role.32 Congress amended
Title 10 and Title 32 of the U.S. Code, which more clearly delineated the National Guard’s state
obligations versus national obligations and service for future actions.33

32

William F. Levantrosser, Congress and the Citizen Soldier (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1967), 63-69.
Doubler, Civilian in Peace, 238-239. Title 10 outlines the role of the United States Armed Forces. It regulates
federal mobilization of National Guard personnel under the command of the President of the United States. Title 32
more specifically outlines National Guard issues, focusing on domestic activation under the command of a state
governor.
33
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The next major federal mobilization came under the Kennedy Administration. During the
Eisenhower years, the military had been reorganized to react to a nuclear conflict. After Kennedy
came into office in 1961, he moved toward a strategy of “flexible response,” one capable of
handling a range of different contingencies, from nuclear warfare to small guerilla operations.34
The Berlin Crisis of 1961 was an event that occurred during the formulation of this new strategy.
Perhaps hoping to intimidate the young President into submission, Russian Premier Nikita
Khrushchev renewed his demand that U.S. forces withdraw from West Berlin. Kennedy’s
response was to prepare for confrontation.35 He put the military on alert, increased defense
expenditures, and requested permission from Congress to mobilize the National Guard and the
Reserves. On July 31, Congress passed a joint resolution that authorized mobilization of up to
250,000 Guardsmen and reservists for a year.
The resulting activation was not without complications for the Guard. Many of the
manpower and training issues from the Korean conflict reappeared. The overall National Guard
response was uneven. Some units were ready within three months while others were not fully
prepared by the demobilization almost a year later. 36 Some Guard critics argue that the
mobilization of the Guard and Reserves was simply a political tool by Kennedy to symbolize
resolve and support from the nation by using its “citizen soldiers.”37 This partial mobilization of
Guardsmen as a tool of foreign policy was unpopular among some of the personnel activated
because it demanded a year of service for what some felt amounted to political showmanship.38

34

George Fielding Eliot, Reserve Forces and the Kennedy Strategy (Harrisburg: The Stackpole Company, 1962) 1-

2.
Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, America’s Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2009), 199.
36
Doubler, Civilian in Peace, 251.
37
Martin Binkin, U.S. Reserve Forces: The Problem of the Weekend Warriors (Washington D.C.: The Brooking
Institution, 1974), 20.
38
Mahon, History of the Militia, 228-230.
35
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Louisiana’s representing units were generally well prepared. The LANG command staff
took the position that it showed Louisiana’s readiness and willingness to engage the communist
threat. Louisiana Army National Guard units federalized included the 159th Evacuation Hospital,
the 3628th Ordnance Company and the 204th Transportation Group at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. The
415th Ordnance Company was sent to Fort Campbell, Kentucky while Baton Rouge’s 769th
Signal Battalion maintained strategic readiness at Fort Polk, Louisiana.39 The result of this
international incident was the construction of the Berlin Wall, but neither side was compelled to
engage in armed conflict. Diplomatic advances, combined with military backup, maintained a
status quo, although Khrushchev was able to stem the tide of refugees fleeing Communist East
Berlin.40
For the Louisiana Guard, however, it signified that enhanced training over the previous
decade created a force prepared for an almost immediate activation.41 The 159th Evacuation
Hospital and the 204th Transportation Group received a “Superior” rating on the Strategic Army
Command Readiness Test. Major General Samuel T. Williams of the 4th Army Field Training
Inspection Board sent 204th commander Colonel Francis Grevemberg a letter commending the
unit’s performance.42 The 769th Signal Battalion was recognized for its performance in a large
Army exercise designated “Iron Dragon” and won the award for “Most Outstanding” nondivisional unit in training at Fort Polk during its time federalized.43 Unlike the complicationplagued activation of the 773rd Tank Battalion for the Korean War, these units had a much

39

Casso, Legacy, 191-192.
Jussi M. Hanhimaki and Odd Arne Westad, eds., The Cold War: A History in Documents and Eyewitness Account.
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 328-331.
41
“Berlin Crisis, LANG 1946-1969” Vertical Files, LANG Archives.
42
Major General Samuel T. Williams to Colonel Francis C. Grevemberg, August-September folder, Box 211-4,
Francis C. Grevemberg Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, Louisiana.
43
State of Louisiana Adjutant General’s Office press release, 2 August 1962, Louisiana National Guard Press
release collection, LANG Archives
40
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smoother and more successful mobilization. Since no combat resulted, the regular Army had no
opportunity to levy individuals from the units. Therefore, unit personnel cohesion remained.
Also, based on the ratings given by Army commanders, the Louisiana units seemed to be well
prepared for this strategic reserve duty relative to many other Army Guard units.
Increasingly integrated combat training was another aspect of the Guard’s military
evolution during the Cold War. In the years 1949-1951, the 39th Infantry Division, consisting of
the Louisiana and Arkansas National Guard, trained together in massive maneuvers, usually
around Fort Polk, Louisiana. During this time, Major General Fleming was in command of the
39th Division while Brigadier General Hufft commanded the Louisiana National Guard.44 The
two Louisiana generals were able to work together for the betterment of the organization, despite
their differences in age, political affiliations, and temperament. The encampment combined
infantry, artillery, armor, various support functions, and even air power into a massive joint
operation. “The single objective of this stepped up training program is to crowd as much military
training as possible into as little time as possible without interfering with the jobs or studies of
Louisiana’s Guardsmen.”45 It is a reminder that for most of their time, these soldiers and airmen
were citizens who maintained normal jobs or went to school with other civilians.
In addition to the military training, Hufft wanted to provide some morale to the annual
commitment. In 1949 and following years, he had Lieutenant Harold “Hoss” Memtsas, head
football coach at Warren Easton High School and former Tulane University football star, run an

44
45

State of Louisiana Adjutant General’s Office press release, 1 July 1949, LANG Archives.
State of Louisiana Adjutant General’s Office press release, 17 January 1951, LANG Archives
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athletics program. After the battle simulations, soldiers were given the opportunity to play
basketball, softball, and volleyball as well as participate in swimming and boxing competitions.46
Several advances in training at the national level would have improved the overall
readiness of the Guard for federal mobilization as well as domestic activations. Authorized
strength for the National Guard increased in the late 1940s and early 1950s. It is likely Hufft was
using the highly publicized Louisiana training events as a recruitment tool. During the Korean
War, in particular, these activities might have attracted young men to the Guard as an alternative
to being drafted into the regular Army. In 1947, the personnel strength of the Louisiana National
Guard was 3,636 officers and enlisted men. By 1955, it was up to 9,796. After 1955, it decreased
slightly and fluctuated between 7,000 and 8,500 up to 1965.47
The 1955 Reserve Forces Act indicated a need for stronger, more ready reserves. The US
Army had to ensure viable units in case they were called up for active duty. One major policy
shift was that all Guard recruits had to go through a standard six month basic training, conducted
by “Big Army.” The National Guard Association protested in Congress on the basis that this
policy would hurt recruiting efforts and cause issues with employers. Recruiting did take a slight
and temporary hit. An unintended benefit, however, is that the National Guard was freed from all
individual basic training obligations. This allowed states to focus on unit development and
training for domestic activation scenarios in addition to typical drill and annual exercises.
Concurrently, states created or improved on their own Officer Candidate Schools. Many states,
including Louisiana, eventually instituted Non Commissioned Officer training schools as well.

State of Louisiana Adjutant General’s Office press release, 30 June 1949 and 26 July 1951, LANG Archives.
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The maintenance of an internal state training for officers and NCOs provided dedicated and
continuous leadership.48
Monthly drill policies were improved. Prior to changes in the mid-fifties, drills were two
hours a week, forty eight times a year, and capped with a two week annual training program. Not
a great deal could be accomplished within these short weekly drill periods. This changed to one
weekend a month with longer sessions. Longer drill periods, while not necessarily changing the
quantity of training hours, provided an opportunity for higher quality and productivity in training
and drills. Furthermore, the Army authorized additional drills to enhance more specialized
training. Brigadier General (Retired) Curney J. Dronet, a lifelong Guardsman, mentioned in his
history of the Louisiana infantry that these factors progressively improved state Guard training
from the mid-nineteen fifties into the sixties.49
Unit diversity, with accompanying military occupation specialties, was allowed to
expand. Prior to World War II, Guard units were generally tied to traditional infantry roles,
including artillery and cavalry. After World War II, the Army’s technological advancement and
increasingly diverse needs required more of its reserves. The 1950s saw a proliferation of antiaircraft units, probably connected to the Guard’s civil defense role. More lasting types of units
that were formed or expanded in the Louisiana Guard included medical, transportation, aviation,
and engineering.
A good example of unit specialization is the LANG Special Forces. Unhappy with the
Eisenhower administration’s emphasis on nuclear warfare, the Command and General Staff
College drafted a strategy for combatting Communist insurgencies. Using both military and
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political capabilities, small units would be trained in guerrilla warfare, counter insurgency
techniques, civil disturbances, counterintelligence, psychological warfare, and civil affairs
assistance. Senator John F. Kennedy, a presidential candidate at the time and a member of the
Senate Foreign Relations committee, supported special operations as part of a more diverse
strategy that would eventually evolve into his future administration’s “flexible response”
stance.50
Louisiana was one of five states to organize Special Forces units in their Army National
Guard as part of a larger Special Operations force that expanded further when Kennedy became
president.51 Beginning in 1959, the unit went through a few re-designations before being known
as Company D, 20th Special Forces Group. The unit had three detachments, one each at New
Orleans, Baton Rouge and Breaux Bridge.
Hufft’s prior service with the First Special Service Force and continued affiliation with
some of the policy proponents in Washington may have put Louisiana on the short list. Some
soldiers from the unit say he was personally acquainted with Kennedy.52 Hufft was directly
involved in the recruiting and organization of this specialized outfit. He probably stationed the
third detachment in Breaux Bridge, a small Cajun hamlet, because his good friend Lieutenant
Colonel Patin was a native there. Patin, who commanded the Breaux Bridge unit, had been an
airborne soldier during World War II who had become close with Hufft. Lieutenant Colonel John
Boh, another airborne veteran and Office of Strategic Services member now in the Louisiana
Guard, also helped General Hufft recruit officers and enlisted men. Prior to the unit’s first
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qualifying jump at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Hufft had custom jump boots made for the men
and made sure he was the first one off the plane in the ensuing training exercise. This sort of
bravado is what made many look up to Hufft while it turned others off.53

Courtesy Louisiana National Guard Archives
Earlier training missions had the unit jumping in Louisiana and training in the Deep
South states of Florida, Georgia, and Alabama. Tensions heated up in Latin America as a result
of Fidel Castro’s takeover of Cuba and the Special Forces units received more attention. The
Kennedy Administration’s entry into the Vietnam conflict also beefed up Special Forces training.
Rather than the woods of Alabama or Louisiana, Company D began training in the jungles of
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Panama and Puerto Rico. President Johnson’s escalation put the unit on alert for a deployment to
Southeast Asia. Policy shifted in 1968, however, putting the brakes on such a mobilization.
Several members of Company D voluntarily transferred to the regular Army for Vietnam service,
some paying the ultimate price.54
While active federal involvement for the Louisiana National Guard was limited during
the years 1946-1965, development during that time was critical. Readiness capabilities appeared
to improve over the decade from the Korean War to Kennedy’s Berlin Crisis. Reforms at the
federal level did not necessarily create more training hours but effected a more efficient use of
drill. Hufft, in particular, sought to maximize unit training within whatever small windows were
available. Six month Army basic training for individual recruits enhanced readiness, while
allowing the Guard to maximize annual training and monthly drill for unit development and
inter-operability within the LANG itself. While personnel strength fluctuated, the size of the
LANG remained much higher than it was prior to or immediately after World War II. More
bodies were available for federal mobilization or domestic activation. Unit specialization showed
an increase in professionalism and training beyond the traditional infantry role. Louisiana’s
Congressional delegation was often fighting for its Guard as well. Powerful Congressmen
Overton Brooks and F. Edward Herbert, in particular, were almost always in support of the
“Guard lobby.”55 Political competition between certain factions supporting “Big Army” and
those supporting the National Guard in some ways created a more professional force. Winston
Wilson, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, said that the National Guard had moved from being
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“near professional” in the recent past toward being “the full professional” organization by
1963.56
The Cold War may not have required most Louisiana Guardsmen to enter a “hot
conflict,” but these developments directly and indirectly benefited the organization in its
domestic roles. Quicker reaction times, integrated training of different types of units, unit
diversification, and better individual training could only enhance the Guard’s roles in civil
defense and emergency response.
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Chapter 2: Civil Defense
While the mission as a reserve force for the U.S. Armed Forces has always been the
tradition of the Guard and the state militias that preceded it, domestic civil defense against
potential foreign enemy action was something not seen since the War of 1812. Civil defense
during the Cold War entailed defending the homeland from a potential Soviet attack. The
assumption was that the U.S. Army would be either crippled or otherwise occupied in foreign
territory to deal with the aftermath of an attack on the continental U.S. Domestic forces would be
necessary to deal with the situation. 57 The National Guard was an ideal choice but the primary
role of the organization was to act as a reserve for the regular military branches. Therefore, it
was possible that the Guard would also be unavailable to defend local populace from bombings
and/or deal with the after effects of a nuclear attack. Efforts in the late 1940s and early 1950s
were to enlist the general public as civil defenders.58
American culture was in the midst of a “Red Scare.” The public underwent air raid drills
and schoolchildren were trained to “duck and cover” under their desks when the alarms sirens
wailed.59 The notion of every citizen being responsible for civil defense was partially tied into
cultural concerns over the “nuclear family” and maintaining gender roles in the post-war, noncommunist world. Practical policies regarding the military defense of the United States were
culturally connected to fears of internal subversion by left wing forces.60 Pro-American
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sentiment became synonymous with anti-communism.61 This manifested in ways that could be
seen as positive as well as negative. Ray Hufft was a classic “Cold Warrior” and typified the
conservative American ideal during the time period. On one hand, he provided temporary
housing for refugees from the Soviet crackdown on Hungary in 1956.62 On the other hand, his
incendiary Memorial Day speech about the United Kingdom’s trade policies with Communist
China provoked protest from the British Consul in New Orleans.63 Ray Fleming took a more
moderate tone. For example, in 1954 he joined local officials at a dinner honoring Ethiopian
leader, Haile Selassie.64 A proponent of the non-alignment movement of third world nations and
the savior of the Rastafarian religion, Selassie was not communist but tended to irk the more
conservative elements in the U.S. It is doubtful that Hufft would have been at that dinner were he
the adjutant general in 1954. As a combination of viable homeland defense strategy and a
reflection of the anti-communist cultural trend of the period, Fleming and Hufft were heavily
involved with civil defense efforts in Louisiana.
The idea of a state level civil defense agency predated the Cold War. Fleming directed
preparation for a plan prior to World War II under the administration of Governor Sam Jones.65
It was years, however, before formal organizing began. Named by Earl Long as Louisiana’s
Civil Defense Director in 1950, Hufft set out to establish more permanent civil defense plans.
After attending conferences with federal officials and members of the National Guard
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Association in Washington, Hufft went on a public relations blitz in Louisiana that combined
genuine attempts to create a sense of civic duty with outright “red baiting.” He stressed that the
civil defense plans were for war only, and that they would not be concerned with disaster relief.
He also expressed a concern of subversive infiltration, “We certainly don’t want communists and
other traitors to be in a position to sabotage the civil defense functions in some future
emergency.”66 Hufft spoke to several organizations, including the Rotary Clubs of Alexandria
and New Orleans and veterans groups statewide, concerning the evils of communism and leftists.
He promised that civil defense outlets will be screened at the local and state level “to prevent the
infiltration of communists into this extremely important organization.”67 Hufft urged the state’s
residents to participate in civil defense programs such as the Ground Observers’ Corps and
volunteer “ham” radio warning networks.68
President Truman created The Federal Civil Defense Administration by Executive Order
10186 in 1950. The Louisiana Civil Defense Agency was established by the state legislature the
same year. Between 1950 and 1952, most of the state agency’s efforts under Hufft were directed
at public awareness of the importance of civil defense. It was not until after Fleming’s return to
Louisiana in late 1952, however, that the Agency was fully active as an organization. According
to the 1952-1953 biennial report, “The primary mission of the Louisiana Civil Defense Agency
is to minimize the effects of enemy action upon the civilian population and to thus enable a
continuation of the war effort.”69 It goes on to outline the responsibilities, including education,
communications with the federal and local levels, and the establishment of an adequate
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organization to control and direct all resources of the state, parishes, and municipalities to cope
with emergency conditions that may result from enemy action. This 1952-1953 report briefly
mentions that disaster response was a secondary mission.70 Despite the existence of the Federal
Civil Defense Agency, state, local, and private efforts remained at the forefront since federal
programs for things such as evacuation and shelter administration were impractical and deemed
inefficient.71
The National Guard was closely connected to the state’s civil defense program and the
adjutant general of Louisiana selected the director. Fleming named one of his assistant adjutant
generals, Brigadier General Francis Woolfley to the post. Woolfley was a highly respected
veteran of World War I who served a successful active duty career before joining the Guard,
including time as the chief of staff for U.S. Army forces in Turkey.72 Other prominent
Guardsmen who became planners, coordinators, and directors in the Louisiana Civil Defense
Agency were Colonel Frank Spiess, Colonel Anees Mogabgab, Colonel John Boh, and Colonel
Numa Avendano.73 Colonel Francis Grevemberg, commander of the 204th Anti-Aircraft Group
and 204th Transportation Group, was the head of the Louisiana State Police, which was also
closely coordinated with the Civil Defense Agency. While all these men had proven able in the
field of battle or as effective organizers and administrators in the military, their appointment
undermined the idea of civilian control of civil defense. Indeed, as the decade wore on, the
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National Guard’s role in civil defense seemed to grow as the reliance on civilians faded. After
the Korean War wound down and there were no enemy attacks on U.S. soil, Louisiana’s civilian
population became less concerned about nuclear holocaust or an impending Russian attack.
Local author Mary Lou Widmer writes that New Orleanians, in particular, went on with their
lives and “forgot about not being able to build bomb shelters, and then concentrated instead on
building barbecue pits.”74 Despite media and government hype, the Louisiana public seemed to
become apathetic about civil defense.75 Between the carnival of New Orleans culture, the
booming post-war economy, and the “Sportsman’s Paradise” provided by the rest of the state,
there was likely too much else to focus on than a Soviet nuclear threat.
By the mid-1950s, the Louisiana Civil Defense Agency and the Louisiana National
Guard seemed to merge their missions. In 1952, the Louisiana National Guard opened
enlistment of anti-aircraft units to men over 35. Colonel Grevemberg’s 204th Anti-Aircraft Group
expanded. Its three anti-aircraft battalions were given increased responsibility. They cooperated
with regular Army units as part of the country’s master defense plan in case of a conventional
attack by the USSR or other aggressors. The raising of age limits allowed soldiers with
experience to fill out the enhanced units.76 No longer were the civilian Ground Observers Corps
as integral to the nation’s air defenses as military functions picked up.

Widmer, New Orleans in, 34. South Louisiana’s swampy topography prevents digging more than a few feet
before water fills the hole. Underground bomb shelters, a phenomenon in drier or higher parts of the nation, were
largely impossible in this area.
75
Gregory J. Schloesser, “The Bomb on the Bayou: Nuclear Fear and Public Indifference in New Orleans, 19451966” (master’s thesis, University of New Orleans, 2010), 1-3.
76
State of Louisiana, Adjutant General’s Office press release 20 November, 1952, LANG Archives. The release also
mentions that the 204th AAA Group armory was headquartered at 1700 Moss Street, at the time called “Camp
Nichols.” The same site served as The Confederate Veterans Home, a World War I training site, and a New Orleans
Police Department training area immediately before Hurricane Katrina. In 2013, it was acquired by the Deutches
Haus, a German American social society in New Orleans.
74

26

Another event that heralded the National Guard’s enhanced civil defense role was
“Operation Minuteman” in 1955. This was a surprise nationwide test mobilization for the
National Guard. It was an experiment ordered by the Pentagon to test the domestic readiness of
state Guard units to mobilize domestically in the event of a nuclear attack on U.S. soil. Out of the
9,773 Guardsmen in Louisiana, 8,380 of them, or 86% of the state’s forces reported to their
armory within a couple of hours. Bogalusa’s 105th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion had 96%
personnel quickly show up for the surprise mobilization, one of the best performances in the
nation. The overall national percentage was about 67%. General Fleming directed the operation
in Louisiana by contacting unit commanders via short wave radio. Individual Guardsmen were,
in turn, notified by telephone and by local media cooperation.77 Similar to the traditional military
role, the Louisiana Guard’s domestic activation performance seemingly improved over the
decade due to training and effective leadership. At least part of this came from the increased
militarization of civil defense due to lack of public volunteerism as well as the close ties between
the Louisiana Civil Defense Agency and the Louisiana National Guard.
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Louisiana’s 935th Field Artillery Battalion, circa 1950s. Courtesy Louisiana National
Guard Archives.
This trend was further reflected at a national level when President Eisenhower merged
the Federal Civil Defense Administration with other agencies to form the Office of Civil and
Defense Mobilization (OCDM). This agency had more of a military presence than Truman’s
FCDA. Public interest in civil defense waned through the late fifties and early sixties, with a
brief surge during and immediately after the Cuban Missile Crisis.78 President Kennedy
transferred civil defense responsibilities to the Defense Department and OCDM was renamed the
Office of Emergency Planning (OEP).79 In 1964, the Pentagon officially connected the federal
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mission of civil defense to the National Guard and specifically named disaster relief one of the
functions of this role.80
Reports of the Louisiana Civil Defense Agency in the late 1950s into the 1960s show that
it progressively moved away from an active response role and a recruiter of patriotic civilians
toward more of a coordinating agency, facilitating communications between the Louisiana
National Guard, other state first response agencies, the Red Cross, and, if necessary, the federal
government and active military. The Agency also gravitated toward a funding role, managing
federal grants to public facilities damaged in disasters.81 While mobilization in the face of an
enemy attack was named as the primary reason for civil defense plans and agencies in the period,
civil defense and disaster response can be seen to merge as the Cold War progressed. Increased
federal funding from the federal civil defense agencies, combined with the Louisiana state
government’s efforts to coordinate various agencies for emergency response, proved useful to a
state with a propensity for disaster. Despite earlier attempts to separate these two functions,
Mother Nature and industrial accidents seemed to pose a greater threat to Louisiana citizens than
the communists could. In 1966, a U.S. Army officer affiliated with national civil defense
summarized it best by stating, “Our main effort is designed to help state and local government
achieve a level of competence to survive enemy attack. If we accomplish this, we also attain a
highly respectable and effective capability to cope with a natural disaster.”82

80

Annual Report of the Chief, National Guard Bureau, Fiscal Year 1964, Washington DC.
Biennial Reports, 1952-1953, 1954-1955, 1956-1957, 1958-1959, 1960-1961, 1962-1963, Adjutant Generals
Reports, LANG archives.
82
“Anti-Hurricane Plans Told,” Times Picayune April 27, 1966.
81

29

Chapter 3: Emergency Response
The 1958 report of the Louisiana Civil Defense Agency shows a marked shift from a
concern over enemy attack to one of dealing with natural and man-made disasters. While
sections still existed referring to plans in case of nuclear or conventional offensives by another
nation, one of the longer sections describes the agency’s new “Natural Disaster Relief Plan” and
its longest entry in the Operations Section is about the state response to Hurricane Audrey.83 As
the Louisiana National Guard became a more important factor in civil defense readiness and
improved its effectiveness regarding military efficiency and coordination, the afterthought of
emergency response moved more and more to the heart of the organization’s mission.
Even as hurricanes and floods began to replace Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile
systems as the major threat to the state’s citizenry, emergency response was not a new role for
the Guard. As early as 1890, Louisiana governors had been activating the state militia for
hurricanes and floods.84 The Great Flood of 1927 was the pinnacle of Guard response efforts
prior to the Cold War. Fleming commanded the 141st Field Artillery (Washington Artillery)
during the Great Flood. His field report to then Adjutant General Louis Toombs typifies the
Guard response at that time. It included patrols to ensure that no one sabotaged the levee
upstream from their own residence, rescue of stranded civilians, evacuation support and refugee
support. In today’s lexicon, “refugee support” would equate to delivery of food, water, and other
commodities to evacuee shelters and individuals, i.e. “commodity distribution.” The Guard also
assisted the Red Cross in organizing and administering the refugee shelters.85 This went far
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beyond previous emergency responsibilities. Given the resources and technology of the time,
guardsmen were extremely active during that event. Despite the impressive effort in 1927,
though, the lack of post-World War II technology, travel infrastructure, and federal funding
limited the possibilities of response. The 1930s and early 1940s saw some emergency response
efforts, but nothing on the level of the 1927 flood.86
After World War II, the Army National Guard was given surplus Army vehicles and
equipment, including high water trucks, jeeps, and the amphibious DUKWs, pronounced
“ducks.”87 Beyond that, they also worked with the Louisiana Air National Guard for aerial
survey and eventually built up an inventory of helicopters. Higher national training standards
required for a potential World War III scenario made the Guard units quicker to respond, and
gave them practice working together. Civil defense initiatives connected Guard leadership to
other state and federal agencies and resources. This situation also gave the Guardsmen some
training with perspective to such things such as damaged infrastructure, looting, maintaining
effective communications, search and rescue, and other symptoms of social/political breakdown
that might result from a nuclear attack. As natural or man-made disasters took the place of
nuclear war fears, the National Guard, along with other agencies and organizations, became more
practiced in response initiatives. Even some of the critics of the National Guard system admit
that the organization saw an increase in domestic responsibilities into and through the 1960s.88
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The period also a saw a progressive increase in the size of engineer units within the
Louisiana National Guard. The 225th Engineer Aviation Battalion was formed in 1954 in the
Louisiana Air National Guard but was quickly re-allotted to the Army Guard. Headquartered at
Jackson Barracks, the engineers’ role in disaster response grew with each disaster. In 1963, it
was expanded to the 225th Engineer Group, consisting of multiple battalions.89 Cranes, dump
trucks, bulldozers and other equipment were added to the Guard’s arsenal. While engineer units
certainly had value in a combat setting, they also had obvious advantages for disaster response,
including infrastructure repair, road clearing, communications support, transportation, and other
missions.
A clear line of positive development in emergency response can be seen from 1946
through Hurricane Betsy in 1965. In 1947, floods inundated southwest Louisiana and a hurricane
struck near New Orleans. The Guard response was robust in each case, but remained similar to
traditional actions, such as waterborne rescue, evacuation support, and security from looting.90 In
1948, the Mississippi River levee burst at Port Allen, creating a major flood disaster. The area
deluged was sparsely populated but the Guard response was quick and effective. The 769th AntiAircraft Battalion used DUKWs and high water trucks to rescue three hundred people who were
in harm’s way. Six Army and Air Guard units immediately assisted with aerial reconnaissance,
sandbagging efforts, communications, and the transportation and distribution of meals to
evacuees and relief laborers. The coordination between different types of units is notable in the
reports, as are the communications used.
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In 1949, General Hufft broadened the Guard’s emergency role when he ordered Guard
units to help with drought relief in St. Bernard, Plaquemines, and Jefferson parishes. Guard tank
trucks delivered over 250,000 gallons of potable water to citizens until sufficient rainfall ended
the drought. In 1950, Hufft sent members of his staff to the scenes of disasters elsewhere in the
United States to study and report on the successes and failures of others in emergency response.
The resulting state disaster plan was one of the more comprehensive in the U.S. at the time.
Liaisons and/or close communications were set up with state agencies, parish governments, the
Coast Guard, and the Red Cross. In addition to “Operation Drink” (above), 1950 saw the Guard
evacuate 2,700 people from river floods in central Louisiana and assist the Red Cross with
tornado victims across communities in Northwest Louisiana. When a hurricane again threatened
Southeast Louisiana, Hufft’s civilian “ham” radio network aided the Adjutant General’s Office
in getting accurate information and filtering out “wild rumors of loss of life and destruction of
property.” This short lived civil defense initiative was helpful after all.91
When Fleming returned to Louisiana in 1952, he continued and expanded on Hufft’s
disaster plans. Coordination and communication, both internally and with all state and federal
agencies, was further solidified. The next year, heavy rains produced more flooding in central
and southwest Louisiana. The Louisiana Army National Guard assisted the Coast Guard with the
evacuation of 8,900 people in 25 parishes. When Hurricane Flossie hit in 1956, the Guard took
similar actions, but engineering operations were added as Guard cranes removed boats and large
debris from roadways in the aftermath of the storm.92
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In 1957, Hurricane Audrey hit the state. Louisiana’s first storm to have its name “retired”
by the National Weather Service, it was the first truly horrific emergency of this time period.
Others resulted in damaged property and occasional loss of life, but Audrey completely
devastated Cameron and Vermillion parishes. It brought about one of the largest death tolls prior
to Hurricane Katrina in 2005. The storm covered coastal portions of those parishes with water
and shut down communication infrastructure there. Guard aerial reconnaissance was the only
way to immediately survey the destruction. National Guard vehicles quickly transported doctors,
nurses, medical supplies and food as close to the flooded areas as they could. DUKWs went out
into the floodwaters to pluck survivors from trees, rooftops, and floating debris. Perhaps the most
gruesome expansion of responsibilities involved the collection of decomposing bodies and
transportation to an icehouse that was acting as a temporary morgue. While this response
involved the usual coordination with state agencies and the Coast Guard, the severity of Audrey
also brought cooperation with the regular Armed Forces, including the Army and Air Force.93
Works based on civilian oral histories and memoirs recall caravans of DUKWs and
helicopter rescues. The National Guard cordoned off the hardest hit areas until debris clearing
and body recovery could take place. Rushing storm victims to hospitals and makeshift medical
facilities was another aspect of civil defense and military units. According to Cameron Parish
resident, Cathy C. Post, “Diesel fumes from the army vehicles filled the air.” 94 Another civilian
account recalls military helicopters working day and night to aid survivors. Waters were moving
so swift around Arvin Primeaux’s rooftop sanctuary, DUKWs had a difficult time rescuing him,
but eventually did.95 Among other shelters, such as McNeese Cowboys stadium and Chennault
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Air Force base, the armory headquarters of the Louisiana Guard’s 3-156th Infantry Battalion
housed thousands of storm victims.96 In 1961, the lessons of Audrey led to Louisiana’s largest
evacuation of coastal territories up to that time. The National Guard assisted the LCDA and other
state agencies in evacuating an estimated 50,000 to 80,000 residents before Hurricane Carla
struck the area.97
Louisiana disasters were not just of the natural variety. The National Guard responded to
multiple industrial accidents between 1946 and 1965. In 1954, a gas well explosion in St. Martin
Parish resulted in unsafe conditions around the site. Area units assisted local law enforcement in
cordoning off the zone. In 1957, an oil refinery fire in Meraux created a hazard for the residents
of the area. Heavy rains turned the ground into thick, sludgy mud, complicating the situation.
Guardsmen from Jackson Barracks not only cordoned off the area and helped with firefighting,
but the military jeeps proved effective in the transportation of foamite from trucks on nearby
roads to the immediate refinery site. Engineering operations were brought in as Guard bulldozers
created a dam to trap the leaking gasoline and prevented the fire from spreading. Helicopters
were used to transport fire-fighting equipment and foamite from the airport to St. Bernard
Parish.98 By the mid-sixties, the Louisiana National Guard’s experience with disasters was broad.
In 1964, the aging Ray Fleming retired from the adjutant general position for the third
and final time, and Governor John McKeithen passed over Hufft for a former Army Reserve
commander from southwest Louisiana, Major General Erbon Wise. Most of the Guard command
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staff and leadership remained the same, however, as did the personnel in the Louisiana Civil
Defense Agency. The emergency systems and procedures established by Fleming and Hufft
remained in place. In the years leading up to the onslaught of Hurricane Betsy, the Louisiana
National Guard had established itself as the main line of first response, supplemented by the
Coast Guard, assisting state agencies, and the Red Cross. When Hurricane Betsy struck on
September 9, 1965, it proved to be “The Big One” as heavily populated areas near and inside
New Orleans found themselves in its path. The storm surge over-topped levees, flooding most of
Plaquemines and St. Bernard Parishes. The densely populated Ninth Ward of New Orleans
flooded as well. Baton Rouge and parts of Acadiana were also affected. Betsy was the worst
storm to hit Southeast Louisiana since 1915. It killed 81 people, injured over 17,600, and left
250,000 homeless.99 The first storm to cause over a $1,000,000,000 in damages, it was
nicknamed “Billion Dollar Betsy.”100 The activation called up about 3,200 Guardsmen, making it
the largest up to its time. It encompassed thirty five of the state’s sixty four parishes.101
The Adjutant General’s staff set up an Emergency Operations Center at State
Headquarters in Jackson Barracks. Betsy’s fast and erratic movement created some confusion,
but trucks and DUKWs were sent into the nearby New Orleans and St. Bernard Parish
neighborhoods as well as into Plaquemines Parish. Rescue operations began immediately. Guard
vehicles brought survivors to the St. Claude Avenue Bridge where they were subsequently
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moved again to public buildings in the city. Other inundated areas requiring search and rescue
were Gentilly and New Orleans East.102
Missions varied widely for the Guard during Hurricane Betsy. Security operations
included support of New Orleans Police Department as businesses and homes were being looted
in the drier parts of town. Guard duty at shelters was also considered necessary as fears of civil
unrest abounded. Two hundred Guardsmen provided security at a large consolidated refugee
center in Algiers. Military police waded in chest high water in some cases to direct the traffic of
rescue vehicles. Commodity distribution played a greater role than it ever had before.
Guardsmen hauled food, clothing, and ice into the affected area from North Louisiana. In
addition to water and food rations, units provided portable bathing capability, electric generators,
and set up field kitchens for civilians and soldiers alike.103 Medical missions increased as medics
provided immunizations and first aid for storm victims and incoming soldiers. Hay was
transported to stranded cattle and horses in rural areas.104 Many Guardsmen from the New
Orleans metropolitan area suffered considerable personal loss in the event, yet remained on duty
for the duration of the activation.105
Despite a full activation of units in the Southern portion of the state, New Orleans
required extra help. 4th Battalion of the 156th Infantry Regiment came all the way down from the
Shreveport area for storm duty. Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Ansel Stroud, it provided
help to some of the hardest hit sections of the city. One of its more unpleasant duties entailed
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animal control operations. Some neighborhoods were over run by snakes, rats, and feral dogs.
The soldiers cleared those zones as tasked.106 Units from around the state moved five thousand
refugees from City Hall to the Municipal Auditorium which had more room and was easier to
manage. Jackson Barracks itself was partially flooded by Betsy. Areas closer to the Mississippi
River stayed dry while other parts of post got up to four feet of water. Residents of the Ninth
Ward, Arabi, and Chalmette were evacuated to the dry area of the Barracks and subsequently to
other public buildings and shelters.107
The Guard collaborated with a wide array of other organizations due to the scope of the
disaster. State Headquarters maintained contact with the governor’s office, 4th Army
Headquarters, and the federal Office of Emergency Preparedness, in addition to the state and
parish civil defense agencies. Requests were made to other states and to the regular Armed
Forces for helicopters and pilots to assist rescue operations. Louisiana’s 39th Aviation Battalion
had limited resources to effect search and rescue on its own. Guard helicopters were used
primarily for transportation, reconnaissance, and communications. An emergency heliport was
established inside Jackson Barracks, near the levee. Colonel Numa Avendano, former
commander of the Washington Artillery, coordinated the Louisiana Civil Defense Agency with
the National Guard, the federal Office of Emergency Preparedness and other agencies. The
Guard partnered with The Salvation Army and The Urban League for commodity distribution in
New Orleans. The Louisiana Guard also worked with the 4th Army, based out of Fort Polk,
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Louisiana. 4th Army units administered refugee shelters and assisted with commodity distribution
for almost 2 weeks in multiple parishes.108
In some cases, local governments proved uncooperative with each other or the federal
government, causing the Louisiana Guard to intervene. In Grand Isle, for example, municipal
and parish officials bickered with each other about responsibilities, causing delays in aid to
residents. The Guard ultimately took care of commodity distribution there and helped with
evacuation and shelter. Another complication was the notorious leader of Plaquemines Parish.
Leander Perez would not accept direct aid from the federal government. He was a strident
advocate for “local rule” and a harsh opponent of the federal government’s recent efforts at racial
integration. Regardless of his ideology, parish residents needed assistance. Federal agencies
relied solely on the Louisiana Guard to evacuate the victims in Plaquemines. This “compromise”
was acceptable to Perez because the Guard activation was under the command of Governor
McKeithen and not any federal entity.109 Lower Plaquemines was so affected that it was
temporarily sealed off. Guardsmen blockaded roads entering the area until debris clearing and
other recovery operations could take place.110 Similar to 4th Battalion in New Orleans, 1st
Battalion of the 156th Infantry Regiment had the heartbreaking task of capturing starving and
aggressive dogs in Venice, Louisiana. Most were sick from drinking salt water and had to be
euthanized. Lieutenant Roy Bailey managed to save and adopt a female Sheppard mix, naming
her “Betsy.”111
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The Guard was active in other parts of Louisiana for Betsy. Company C of the 769th
Signal Battalion performed constant operations for eleven days in Lafourche Parish. The 119
man unit rotated shifts for various jobs including clearing roads, removing debris, directing
traffic, distributing ice and providing security from potential looters.112 Units performed missions
in Houma and Donaldsonville as well. Near Baton Rouge, Betsy’s wrath included industrial
accident response as a chlorine barge sank, creating a potential chemical event, hazardous to the
nearby population.113 LANG supplied six hundred soldiers with personnel transport vehicles in
case a speedy evacuation was necessary.114 Company A of the 769th reported to Morganza as
ruptured gas lines created a fire and explosion hazard. They supported utility crews in shutting
down the gas mains and in keeping civilians clear of the danger areas.115
Even the former commanders of the earlier Cold War period did not miss out on Betsy’s
action. The retired Fleming, now 76 years old, was allowed residency at Jackson Barracks. He
and his wife were evacuated from the facility by Guard forces during the response. General
Hufft, appointed regional customs collector by President Kennedy in 1962, communicated with
the state Guard headquarters during Betsy. The Daily Staff Journal maintained during the
activation mentions his name several times but does not indicate specifics about his involvement.
It is unsurprisingly, however, that the relatively young Hufft would want a “piece of the action”
during such a dramatic response operation.116
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The official activation period for Betsy was from Thursday September 9 to Tuesday
September 21. Round the clock operations occurred during that window of operation.117 The
National Guard and other first responders were praised by most officials following the Betsy
response. When visiting New Orleans in the aftermath, President Lyndon Johnson explicitly
commended the local first response efforts.118 Several letters to General Wise from various
officials and local business owners in southeastern Louisiana showed appreciation of LANG
actions. There was, however, some criticism. Dr. Edward Teller, a prominent nuclear physicist
and government advisor, criticized the response as confused and ineffective. His criticism was
based largely on the premise of civil defense abstractions. The failure of state and local
authorities to evacuate the area before Betsy’s landfall was a bad indicator of what would happen
in case of a nuclear attack. Perhaps more grounded in the immediate needs of his constituents
and having actively participated in first response efforts, New Orleans Mayor Victor Schiro
characterized Teller’s statements as “ridiculous and irresponsible.”119 US Army documents and
the Louisiana National Guard’s own after action reports included more practical criticism. One
of the main complaints was a dearth of effective communication. While this was somewhat true
of internal communications, the problem was particularly bad for inter-agency coordination
during the event. Most, however, came to the conclusion that without the Guard and other
agencies’ quick response efforts, Betsy’s impact would have been much worse.120
A later twentieth century government study came to a specific set of conclusions about
the use of National Guard forces in emergency response. Civilian volunteers are often very
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helpful but one cannot always rely on them to put thoughts about their own property and families
aside. Guardsmen are trained to be organized and disciplined. Their training for combat gives
them an edge up on most civilians in terms of maintaining command and control during
prolonged periods of intense stress and disorder. Members are conditioned to endure discomfort
and dangerous conditions. Guard equipment, such as the amphibious vehicles, 2 1/2 ton trucks,
helicopters, and rugged terrain vehicles, can serve in an emergency response role as well as
traditional military ones. They can put forward a show of force to dissuade potential looters or
those who may otherwise take advantage of chaotic situations. Some would also say that state
military organizations also embody a certain symbolism that can be seen in a hard or soft light,
as helpers to those in need and also as a force to maintain order. While the latter role can be
manifested in negative ways, most citizens have a sense of relief when seeing a military presence
during a crisis situation. With or without symbolism, the practical aspects of using military
personnel and resources in an emergency situation become obvious as they are applied.121 A
National Guard commander from a later period summarized the point:
If I tell my troops to go out and secure an area, prevent looting, clean the streets
of debris and provide people with shelter, food, and water, I only have to give that
order once, even if the conditions are miserable. No one will say they don’t want
to do it because it is unsafe, raining, dark, cold, too difficult, or will take more
than eight hours to accomplish.122
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One should not downplay the sacrifices of Red Cross workers, local law enforcement, or citizen
volunteers, but the commander does make a valid point.
Why entrust the National Guard with civil defense or emergency response missions
instead of a federal force or the regular Army? Community based units and their headquarters are
prepositioned all over the state, with resources on hand. Through liaison and shared experience,
commanders are often familiar with their counterparts in local government and other state
agencies.123
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The perceived threat of war with the Soviet Union gave the United States defense
establishment a perfect foil to improve overall readiness. Improvements in training and
organization, combined with the preparation for a defense of the homeland, created the tools,
skills, and readiness that the Louisiana National Guard would need in the eventuality of a major
disaster. As the early Cold War period progressed, the emphasis changed from preparedness for a
nuclear attack to the more practical concern of disaster response. As it turned out, Betsy was
more of an immediate danger than Nikita Khrushchev or Fidel Castro.
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Conclusion
The three roles of the Louisiana National Guard during the early Cold War interacted and
affected each other despite their differences. While federal expansion of the Guard and
mandatory improvements in training were not intended to affect civil defense or emergency
response roles, they improved readiness in those areas regardless. The Guard, on a national level,
had uneven improvement in federal mobilization readiness throughout the fifties and sixties. The
Louisiana National Guard, however, seems to have progressed more evenly in comparison to the
national average as seen through the high marks given to Louisiana units during the Berlin
Crisis. Similarly, 1955’s Operation Minuteman was a success in the state for civil defense
purposes. The LANG’s commanders, Ray Fleming and Ray Hufft, effectively managed federal
and state resources to improve the professionalism and readiness of the Guard throughout the
period.
Federal mandates increased manpower and made training practices more efficient and
effective. Civil defense initiatives improved the Louisiana National Guard’s interoperability
within its own ranks as well as with other agencies in the case of a domestic emergency. Military
and civil defense training and policy created diverse units that could activate with speed and
operate well with each other and with other agencies and organizations. As a series of natural
and manmade disasters hit Louisiana from 1946 to 1965, these skills were applied to those
immediate threats. Major General Ansel M. Stroud, Jr was the commander of the 4-156th Infantry
during Betsy and later became adjutant general of the LANG. He remarked in a 1997 interview
that he and the Guard learned a lot about response for a major emergency in that summer of

45

1965. The lessons learned from the previous decades of training and other disasters were applied
to deal with Hurricane Betsy.124
Louisiana National Guard disaster response operations continue to evolve. After the
series of disasters in the 1950s and 1960s, major emergencies became more isolated until the
twin impact of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005 made even Betsy seem mild. In a similar
vein, traditional military activity ramped up again as a result of the multi-front Global War on
Terror. This time, however, the National Guard became an operational force in overseas combat,
with units constantly deployed overseas from 2002 through 2015. After the 9/11/2001 terror
attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, civil defense
agencies again became a major part of federal, state, and local government. In the 21st century,
“Homeland Security” became the accepted term, but these agencies and efforts retained many of
the elements developed by the civil defense initiatives of the Cold War. Emergency response
activations for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were quickly followed by Hurricanes Gustav, Ike,
and Isaac as well as a river flood emergency and a disastrous oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.
Once again, war service, civil defense, and disaster response missions overlapped. The Cold War
evolution of these different, but related, functions of the National Guard led to continued
development in all categories.
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